Central America-U.S. Refugee Agreements Stir Controversy

Central America-U.S. Refugee Agreements Stir Controversy \ Newslooks \ Washington DC \ Mary Sidiqi \ Evening Edition \ Guatemala and Honduras reportedly signed U.S.-backed agreements to host asylum-seekers from other countries. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem announced the move as part of broader Trump-era immigration enforcement tactics. However, both nations denied signing “safe third-country” deals, raising confusion and political tension.

Quick Looks

• New Asylum Plans: Noem says Guatemala and Honduras will now receive asylum-seekers from other countries.
• U.S. Policy Expansion: Follows Trump administration goals to reduce asylum in U.S. by rerouting migrants.
• Denials from Partners: Guatemala and Honduras both deny signing official “safe third-country” agreements.
• Public Skepticism: Local political and resource limitations cast doubt on the feasibility of these pacts.
• Training Initiatives: U.S. Customs agents to help train Guatemalan airport staff in security screenings.
• Historical Context: Similar deals from Trump’s first term struggled due to weak asylum infrastructure.
• Regional Dynamics: Mexico and Central America offer mixed cooperation; some migrants accepted for humanitarian return.
• Broader Implications: U.S. gains deportation flexibility, especially for migrants from difficult-to-return nations.

Deep Look

Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem has stirred international controversy after announcing that Guatemala and Honduras had signed agreements with the United States to accept asylum-seekers from other nations—individuals who would otherwise seek refuge in the United States. Her comments came at the end of a Central American tour focused on expanding the Trump administration’s immigration control strategy.

Framing the move as a way to “offer options” for those fleeing persecution, Noem characterized these deals as an expansion of existing U.S. policy, which already allows the government to send certain migrants back to their home countries. Now, she said, the U.S. could reroute them to so-called “third countries,” giving it greater flexibility to reduce the flow of asylum claims at the U.S.-Mexico border. “We’ve never believed that the United States should be the only option,” she said. “The guarantee for a refugee is that they go somewhere to be safe and protected—not necessarily the U.S.”

However, the announcement has been immediately met with strong denials from both Central American nations. Guatemala’s presidential communications office explicitly stated that no such immigration agreement was signed during Noem’s visit, only reaffirming that the country would temporarily receive Central American migrants en route back to their home nations. Similarly, Honduras’ immigration director Wilson Paz denied any agreement, while its Foreign Ministry remained silent.

The confusion raises critical questions about the transparency and substance of these reported deals. Noem later clarified that there had been a public signing of a memorandum of understanding in Guatemala—but that document focused specifically on a Joint Security Program. This program will place U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers at Guatemala City’s international airport to help local authorities improve screenings for terrorist threats. There was no formal mention of refugee intake responsibilities in that agreement.

Despite the uncertainty, Noem insisted she had received a signed version of the broader refugee agreement during her meeting. That discrepancy highlights the political sensitivity surrounding such deals. Both countries face enormous domestic challenges—limited public resources, weak asylum infrastructure, and internal political pressure. Supporting Trump’s immigration strategy could prove unpopular for their left-of-center governments, especially when it appears to involve taking in non-native asylum-seekers while struggling to support their own citizens.

During Trump’s first term, the U.S. implemented similar “safe third-country” agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These pacts enabled the U.S. to declare asylum seekers ineligible for protection if they passed through another “safe” country before arriving at the U.S. border. But those agreements faced sharp criticism. The nations involved were themselves the source of mass migration due to endemic violence, poverty, and political instability. Their underfunded asylum systems struggled to meet even minimal humanitarian standards, and few asylum-seekers ultimately chose to stay.

In February 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio signed new immigration cooperation deals with El Salvador and Guatemala. The El Salvador agreement permits the U.S. to send migrants for incarceration, while Guatemala’s role is more limited: it serves as a transit point for migrants returning to their home countries. In both cases, the goal remains the same—create regional pathways for managing migrants that bypass the U.S. asylum system altogether.

Meanwhile, Mexico has rejected formal third-country status, with President Claudia Sheinbaum stating that her country will not sign such an agreement. Still, under Trump’s current term, Mexico has quietly accepted over 5,000 migrants from third countries for humanitarian return to their homelands. This includes nationals from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean—regions from which direct U.S. deportations are often difficult or diplomatically sensitive.

Beyond Central America and Mexico, the Trump administration has also forged small-scale arrangements with Panama and Costa Rica. In February alone, 299 migrants were sent to Panama and fewer than 200 to Costa Rica under these agreements. These nations, though more politically stable, have limited capacity for sustained refugee resettlement and typically serve as temporary holding points before return to origin countries.

Collectively, these deals form a patchwork immigration strategy aimed at externalizing the U.S. asylum process. The rationale is logistical and political—reduce court backlogs in the U.S., deter unauthorized border crossings, and maintain a hardline image on immigration ahead of the 2026 midterms. For migrants, however, the result is a murky, uncertain legal pathway often leading to prolonged detention, statelessness, or return to danger.

Domestically, the Biden-era rollback of Trump’s original third-country agreements had shifted the U.S. immigration posture toward a more humanitarian framework. With Trump back in office, the pendulum has swung back toward deterrence, enforcement, and international burden-sharing.

In the absence of clear documentation or formal public signing of these new asylum pacts, the credibility of Noem’s statements—and the U.S. government’s expectations—remains in question. Should these agreements exist in full as described, they would represent a significant evolution in Trump’s immigration architecture. But as it stands, the optics suggest premature announcements, opaque diplomacy, and potential political fallout for America’s Central American partners.

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